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 Muslim Identity, Psychic 
Detachment and Universal Rights 
 Rumy  Hasan 
 Tensions between Muslim identity and 
European citizenship 
 In his letter of 19 January 2015 to 1,000 mosque leaders, UK Communities 
Secretary Eric Pickles asked how faith in Islam can be part of British 
identity (DCLG 2015). This was an implicit recognition that there is a 
tension between being Muslim and British; moreover, it was an acknow-
ledgement by Mr Pickles and his government that there is lack of integra-
tion of Britain’s Muslim communities. Similar sentiments are doubtless 
widespread in Europe so it is unarguably the case that the situation of 
Muslims in the EU has become a major issue for policy makers and for 
society at large. 
 Whilst addressing the radicalisation of Muslims is now of the highest 
priority, there are wider, societal, concerns about Muslims in Europe, 
which are deep-rooted. In France, an opinion conducted by IFOP in 
October 2012 found that 60 per cent of respondents consider that the 
influence and visibility of Islam in France are too high, and that 43 per 
cent of French believe that the presence of a Muslim community in 
France is a threat to the French identity, whilst only 17 per cent consider 
this is a source of enrichment (IFOP 2012). 
 In Germany (which has, after France, the second largest Muslim 
population in the EU), there have since October 2014 been regular 
and substantial anti-Islam marches and rallies (especially in the city 
of Dresden) organised by a newly-formed grassroots movement by 
the name of PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of 
the West). Though the rise of this group was sudden and surprising, the 
potential support for its views is, in fact, very strong. This is attested 
by a survey by the Bertelsmann Foundation in January 2015 which 
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found that 57 per cent of Germans considered Islam “very much” 
or “somewhat”of a threat and that 61 per cent believe that Islam is 
“incompatible with the western world” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015). 
Similar marches have taken place in Norway, Denmark, the Czech 
Republic, Austria, and the UK. 
 In the Netherlands, long renowned for its tolerance and liberalism, the 
anti-Islam  Partij voor de Vrijheid ( PVV ) – ‘Party for Freedom’ – led by the 
controversial Geert Wilders came third in the elections to the EU parlia-
ment in May 2014 and, by late 2014, was leading in the polls. Again, this 
ought not to be unduly surprising given that concerns about Islam have 
existed for a considerable period. For example, a survey conducted by 
Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn as far back as 1998, that is  before 
9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’, showed that approximately half the Dutch 
population thought that “Western European and Muslim ways of life are 
irreconcilable” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 22). 1 
 In Britain too, there has been rising unease about Islam. This is 
evidenced by the  British Social Attitudes Survey of 2010, which highlighted 
the fact that of all the major religions in Britain, only Islam generated 
an overall negative response (Voas and Ling 2010). Similarly, a Populus 
opinion poll in 2011, considered the largest survey into identity and 
extremism in the UK, found that 52 per cent of respondents agreed with 
the proposition that “Muslims create problems in the UK” (a far higher 
percentage than for other religious groups) (Populus 2011). Indeed, such 
negative responses are likely to have increased during the intervening 
years given recent troubling phenomena. These include the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ plot in Birmingham whereby hard-line Islamists were attempting 
to take over the running of a number of state schools in areas which 
are almost entirely comprised of Muslim neighbourhoods; the scandal 
of the ‘grooming’ and child sexual exploitation of white girls by gangs 
of men from a Pakistani Muslim background in several towns and cities 
(in Bristol the perpetrators were Somali men); the killing by Islamists of 
the soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, in May 2013; the fact that 
many British Muslims have joined the jihadist group Islamic State; and 
various terror threats that have been thwarted. All these incidents will 
inevitably increase the negative views about Islam and Muslims. 
 In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the leader of UKIP 
Nigel Farage asserted during an EU parliamentary debate on 12 January 
2015, on the terror attacks in Paris, that “mass immigration had made it 
frankly impossible for many new communities to integrate. We do have, 
I’m afraid, I’m sad to say, a fifth column that is living within our own 
countries, that is utterly opposed to our values” ( BBC News 2015). It is 
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unambiguous that the ‘fifth column’ that Mr Farage was referring to are 
radicalised Muslims. 
 Even Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP are in agreement that migrants 
especially from outside of the EU (a large percentage of whom are Muslim) 
ought to be integrated into mainstream European societies, adhering to 
core universal values, including democracy, freedom of expression, and 
equality of women and gays. 
 UK and other EU countries: different approaches, 
similar outcomes 
 The UK approach regarding immigrants that has long been adhered to 
by both Conservative and Labour governments, albeit without system-
atic design, has been that of ‘multiculturalism’. As a result, a non -inter-
ventionist, laissez-faire principle has been adopted whereby migrants 
can lead lives pretty much akin to those obtaining in their countries 
of origin. This has been backed up with resources and legal provisions. 
This being the case, there has been little attention paid to the integra-
tion of migrants. Moreover, since the early 2000s, all the three major 
parties have described Britain as being a ‘multifaith’ society. In a report 
by the Department of Communities and Local Government, published 
in 2008, entitled  Face to Face and Side by Side , the subtitle makes explicit 
its understanding of British society:  A framework for partnership in our 
multi faith society . Investment was set aside to bring together “faith 
groups” in “partnership” to deliver local services via the creation of a 
new local “Faiths in Action fund” and “Regional Faith Forums”. Indeed, 
the Coalition government of 2010–15 gave this view the  imprimatur of 
a Minister for Faith and Communities – the first government to create 
such a ministerial post. There is, however, a widespread feeling that such 
an approach has not been successful, particularly in regard to Muslims – 
indeed the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, in a speech in Munich 
in February 2011, acknowledged this by stating that “state multicultur-
alism had failed” ( BBC News 2011). Yet, government policies have not 
to any appreciable extent altered from a multiculturalist, multifaith, 
stance, as attested by its commitment to faith schools and faith-based 
free schools and academies. 
 A similar approach to that of Britain has been adopted by the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. As in Britain, the demands 
made by Muslim settlers for separate provisions and exemptions to the 
law is generating considerable disquiet to the point of hostility. Unlike 
Britain, however, there has, in recent years, been greater emphasis in 
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the Nordic countries and the Netherlands on integration; buttressed by 
the appointment of Ministers for Integration. By contrast, Germany had 
long regarded its immigrant population, especially Turkish Muslims, as 
temporary ‘guest-workers’ and not as permanent settlers and citizens. 
But recognising that they were not returning home, a multicultural 
approach also took root in Germany and, as elsewhere, generated prob-
lems which led Chancellor Angela Merkel, in October 2010, to explicitly 
state that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have 
“utterly failed” ( BBC News 2010); precisely the same sentiment that is 
now so prevalent in Britain and the Netherlands. 
 France, by contrast, rejected multiculturalism in favour of a republican 
model that is opposed to separate religious and cultural identities. But 
there was very little emphasis in integrating migrants; rather the reality 
has been of a  de facto multiculturalist, separatist, dynamic augmented 
by the establishment of deprived housing estates for migrants – the 
 banlieue – on the periphery of its town and cities. This was acknowl-
edged by Prime Minister Manuel Valls in a speech in Paris on 20 January 
2015 when he asserted that “the country’s recent terrorist attacks have 
exposed a ‘geographic, social, ethnic apartheid’ present in society” 
( EuroNews 2015). 
 Therefore, notwithstanding the fact of differences in approaches, 
the resultant outcome – albeit to varying degrees – is undeniable, 
that is, there has arisen widespread segregation and ghettoisation 
in towns and cities in several EU countries with large religious and 
ethnic minority communities, especially of Muslims. Rather than a 
new respectful, tolerant, all-encompassing, socially-cohesive, society, 
we see evidence of segregation, ghettoisation, resentment, alienation, 
communal stress, and the leading of what Ted Cantle (2006: 4) has 
termed “parallel lives”. My argument is that some religious-ethnic 
communities have become ‘psychically detached’ from mainstream 
society; the core determinant of which is a powerful religious iden-
tity and it is arguably the case that this is most salient for Muslims. 2 
Evidence suggests that there is a conflict between Muslim identity and 
universal rights and values. 
 Utilising the conceptual device of ‘psychic detachment’ 
 Hitherto, in academic thinking, problems relating to the lack (or even 
absence) of integration of very large numbers of religious-ethnic minority 
communities have been considered to be the result of institutionalised 
racism and a racist discourse writ large (see for example Parekh 2000a; 
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Vasta 2007). These can be deemed the ‘constraint’ factors that religious-
ethnic minority migrants have encountered and which have led to 
their segregation in certain localities of towns and cities among those 
of a similar background (Lakey 1997). Policy prescriptions flowing from 
this view lead to correcting for racism and racist discourse in society, 
augmented by the implementation of anti-discriminatory legislation. It 
is argued that with the removal of these severe constraints, integration 
can proceed apace. 
 My hypothesis is that the constraint factors are no longer dominant 
in the UK: on the contrary, ‘choice’ factors (where religious-minority 
communities ‘choose’ to live and associate among their own) have 
now become a key determinant of segregation and low levels of inte-
gration for at least some religious-ethnic minorities, especially many 
Muslims. 
 What does it mean to say that a group of persons (for our purposes 
here, significant numbers of Muslims) is ‘psychically detached’ from the 
society in which they live? 3 At its extreme it can be seen as immigrants’ 
mode of thinking, belonging, living, as being rooted elsewhere: that is, 
their alienation from the host society is such that they might as well be 
living in another land. In turn, this engenders alienation among a very 
significant percentage of the host population. A strong definition is one 
where there are  no points of contact between the group in question and 
the rest of society, including negligible contact with those from other 
ethnic minority communities. In essence, therefore, ‘detachment’ is the 
obverse of ‘integration’. We postulate the following three phenomena 
as being the necessary and sufficient conditions for psychic detachment 
(Hasan 2010: 100–3):
 1) Normative detachment : where values, beliefs, and attendant practices 
are profoundly different to those of the majority society; 
 2) Social detachment : where there is a lack of inter-personal ‘points of 
contact’ with those not from the same religious-ethnic community; 
 3) Disidentification : where there is very low or zero identification with 
the host society (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). 
 We further hypothesise that these conditions arise with great intensity 
in sharply-segregated areas. A corollary to this is ‘socio-economic’ – or 
‘structural’ – detachment. This frequently occurs in segregated commu-
nities where there has been industrial decline – so that workplaces that 
employed people of various backgrounds no longer exist, thereby leaving 
communities economically marooned, that is, socio-economically 
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detached. However, in our definition, this is not essential to psychic 
detachment: a member of a religious-ethnic minority may work with 
colleagues from other backgrounds but still exhibit high levels of psychic 
detachment if the other three conditions are met. 
 The fundamental argument is that a strong religious identity 
compounded by in-group pressure (self-exclusion) leads to the  intensi-
fication of psychic detachment (in each of the three constituent parts 
indicated). Such a simple model suggests a  mediating process (religious 
identity) between out-group reactions (e.g. unease, hostility) and 
in-group reactions (internal pressures, self-exclusion). The presumption 
is that the higher the levels of psychic detachment of a group (in this 
instance, Muslims), the greater the alienation felt by significant numbers 
of the majority society. Polling evidence highlighted above certainly 
posits this as a persuasive explanation. 
 A related hypothesis is that religion strongly moulds the community 
identity of Muslims, so that there is a high level of self-perception in reli-
gious terms, that is to say the faith becomes a  de facto ethnic marker. This 
is in sharp contrast to the largely-secular indigenous white society in 
Britain and indeed throughout Europe – including in the more religious 
Mediterranean countries. We further hypothesise that the formation of 
a strong religious identity and attendant psychic detachment is directly 
linked to the formation of segregated communities; in turn, this impacts 
upon the welfare and prosperity of citizens within these communities. 
A key outcome is the strong reliance on the “social and cultural capital” 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) of a religious-ethnic community that 
becomes the vital conduit for “economic capital”, survival, and reproduc-
tion. A reinforcing mechanism arises: religion→identity→community
→cultural capital→economic and social capital→intensification of reli-
gious identity→psychic detachment→religion→identity→etc. 
 A key element is the impact of education on psychic detachment and 
the extent to which schools contribute towards the socialisation of their 
pupils into a religious (for our purposes, Muslim) identity. In regard to 
the latter, there appears to be an increase in demand for Muslim faith 
schools; a natural expression of heightened Islamic identity. The key 
question here is whether these schools systematically socialise youths 
into an Islamic identity and, therefore, greatly contribute to psychic 
detachment. If this is indeed the case, then it follows that governments’ 
aim of increasing integration and social cohesion is not likely to be 
served well by religious schools. 
 No matter their political hue, British Governments have, for 
decades, been reluctant to map out a path towards an agreed national 
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identity – at least until recent years when some importance has been 
put on improving social or community cohesion and attention paid to 
factors that are deemed to comprise ‘Britishness’. 
 In stark contrast, community and religious ‘leaders’ and ‘elders’ from 
some religious-ethnic minority groups have been very clear as to where 
they want to get to: the granting of resources, rights, separate laws, and 
exemptions to the law for their respective ‘communities’. Muslim organ-
isations have been assertive in making these demands. For example, the 
Islamic Sharia Council wishes for the principles of  sharia to be eventu-
ally recognised in English law as in the following statement:
 Though the Council is not yet legally recognised by the authorities in 
the UK, the fact that it is already established, and is gradually gaining 
ground among the Muslim community, and the satisfaction attained 
by those who seek its ruling, are all preparatory steps towards the 
final goal of gaining the confidence of the host community in the 
soundness of the Islamic legal system and the help and insight they 
could gain from it (Islamic Sharia Council 2016). 
 In a similar vein, the Muslim Action Forum (MAF) is attempting to bring 
about a  de facto blasphemy law. A press release on 8 February 2015 made 
this clear:
 MAF intends to launch a series of legal challenges in the English Court 
system to establish that such depictions of our Holy Prophet peace be 
upon Him is the worst kind of ‘Hate Crime’ that can be perpetrated 
on the 3 million Muslims in the UK and 1.7 billion Muslims world-
wide. We shall support this strategy through amendment of some 
existing legislation and the presentation of a Private Members Bill 
that promotes the idea of Global Civility (MAF 2015). 
 So far these demands have been resisted by the Government and do 
not have traction in wider society. But this endeavour has greatly been 
assisted by the academy whose theories and ideas have coalesced under 
the rubric of multiculturalism. Unwittingly and aimlessly, this came to 
be adopted by national and local governments and which has engen-
dered and intensified a separatist dynamic. Indeed what has arisen in 
towns and cities across the country are ghettoised  monocultural and 
 monofaith neighbourhoods where mixing with those not of the same 
religious-ethnic group is minimal or practically non-existent. A particu-
larly disturbing aspect of this is the segregation of schools so that large 
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numbers of children from ‘faith communities’ are marooned from the 
majority white society and indeed also from other ethnic groups. 
 The salutary goal of social cohesion requires a concerted inclusiveness 
into mainstream society, in both mental and material terms. But what is 
also of vital importance is the acknowledgment that a gradual withering 
away of ‘faith identities’ will enormously aid the cause of social justice, 
integration, and cohesion. Such a strong claim is based on the rapidly 
declining role of religion in society and the fact that religious identity 
is largely irrelevant to the majority white population. In the UK, with 
the exception of Northern Ireland and pockets of Scotland, the epithets 
‘Protestant’ or ‘Catholic’ as descriptors of identity have long gone into 
desuetude. Public policy, above all in regard to school education, can 
significantly rein in the artificial division engendered by religion, a 
task that is made inordinately easier as a consequence of the relentless 
decline in religious belief in Western societies (though significantly less 
so in the US) so that religious identity has become largely irrelevant to 
the mass of the population. Northern Ireland’s sectarian divisions are a 
sobering reminder of the path that must be avoided. 
 The most common objection to such reasoning is that communities 
have the right to identify themselves with a culture and religion, which 
ought to be acknowledged by the national and local government, and 
wider society. Moreover, this needs to be buttressed by the allocation 
of funds, resources, and legal provisions. The rejoinder to this view is 
that people do indeed have the right to identify themselves whichever 
way they want. But it is not so obvious that people have a right to act 
on chosen identities whose precepts conflict with human rights, or that 
create major problems for society as a whole. What experience has clearly 
shown is that cultural and faith identities tend to be  divisive and not at 
all conducive to social cohesion. Importantly, separate rights, laws and 
exemptions to the laws – in other words legal pluralism – inevitably lead 
to the breach of universalism and equality before the law. 
 Multiculturalists argue that this should be permissible as the principle 
of equality in law is problematic given that it can prohibit certain reli-
gious customs and practices.  Ipso facto , it is tantamount to being discrim-
inatory. This paradoxical reasoning has been acknowledged by the courts 
as in the famous example of the case  Mandla v. Dowell Lee [ Mandla 1983]. 
The House of Lords accepted that it was wrong for a school to impose 
a school uniform policy for all its pupils (the school in question had 
prohibited the wearing of Sikh turbans on the grounds that this was a 
breach of its school uniform policy). In other words, equal treatment 
for all the boys in the school was deemed to be discriminatory against 
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those of the Sikh faith, a key requirement of which is for boys and men 
to wear a turban. Similar reasoning applied to the granting of an exemp-
tion to Sikhs from wearing a helmet on motor cycles and on building 
sites. Other examples of exemptions on the basis of religion include 
Muslim girls being allowed to wear the  hijab in schools, Jewish boys the 
skull cap, Sikh girls a religious bangle; and religious slaughter of animals 
without pre-stunning is granted to Jewish and Muslim abattoirs. 
 But not all exemptions are provided on religious grounds. For example, 
Sikhs are often prevented from carrying a dagger ( kirpan ); Muslims girls 
and women are forbidden from undergoing clitoridectomy (female 
genital mutilation),  Shia Muslims from self-flagellation during their 
 Ashura ceremony. There is no clear operative principle in regard to 
where exemptions on religious grounds are granted and where they are 
not. It seems that if political lobbying is strong enough, governments 
will authorise exemptions. 
 By comparison, exemptions  on non-religious grounds are rarely granted. 
Suppose that at a school, there is a school uniform policy, but exemp-
tions are granted for Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh children. Suppose also 
that some children closely follow the local football team as part of a 
long-standing family and community tradition. Accordingly, they wish 
to wear the club’s shirt to school, and so also be granted exemption 
from the standard school uniform. If the school insists on maintaining 
its policy on uniforms (let us not be detracted here about the merits and 
demerits of school uniforms, or indeed of uniforms in general), it can 
only refuse the exemption with respect to football shirts on the grounds 
that an identity based on allegiance to a football club is less than an iden-
tity based on religion. Such a differential standard is likely to generate 
an alienating and divisive dynamic that can generate increased hostility 
by the sections of the majority society to religious minorities. It is indub-
itably the case that significant sections of the majority may not readily 
understand, or approve, of the normative basis for this decision when it 
is blatantly  unequal . 
 The attempt by OIC countries to subvert universal rights 
 As already stressed, separate laws on the basis of culture and religion 
imply the dilution or rejection of universal human rights. This is not 
ordinarily of concern to Muslim-majority countries where governments 
do not significantly veer away from core Islamic doctrines and are either 
sympathetic or do not wish to alienate religious authorities. So any 
right or law that infringes Islamic beliefs or practices is impermissible, 
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although there are of course variations between countries in strictness of 
application. But these countries also desire to extend such an approach 
to the international arena. This is precisely what has been happening 
at the UN regarding the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( UDHR ) 
passed in 1948; it is important to note that this seminal declaration was 
supported in full by all Islamic countries with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia. However, the fifty-seven-nation OIC (Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference) has been attempting to subvert this. 4 
 In 1990 the OIC adopted the  Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam whose concluding articles (24 and 25) stipulate “All the rights 
and freedoms stipulated in this  Declaration are subject to the Islamic 
 Shari’ah ” and “The Islamic  Shari’ah is the only source of reference for 
the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of the  Declaration ” 
(OIC 1990). At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 
Islamic States pressed for the acceptance of the  Cairo Declaration as an 
alternative to the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (IHEU 2008). 
Its later efforts have been to try and have passed a non-binding reso-
lution against the  defamation of religion . But none of these attempts 
have, hitherto, succeeded. On Human Rights Day, 10 December 2007, 
the Ambassador of Pakistan, addressing the Human Rights Council on 
behalf of the OIC claimed that the  Cairo Declaration “is not an alter-
native, competing worldview on human rights. It complements the 
 Universal Declaration as it addresses religious and cultural specificity of 
the Muslim countries” (IHEU 2008 ) . So far, the majority of countries 
reject this reasoning and, therefore, the  UDHR remains intact. 
 The OIC has a problem with at least two articles (18 and 19), which 
directly conflict with  sharia law in all its variants: 
 Article 18 : Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, prac-
tice, worship and observance; 
 Article 19 : Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interfer-
ence and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers (UNOHCR 1948). 
 What the OIC is arguing is that criticism of religion is defamatory and is 
akin to racism – conflating  ideas/ideology with  people . That is to say, reli-
gious people are hurt by criticism, thereby are not accorded due respect 
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and recognition. This is deemed to be equivalent to physical harm. In 
essence, the OIC is applying and extending multicultural, multifaith 
thinking to the global arena. They are in fact demanding  privileges for 
religious beliefs and practices that are buttressed by stringent legisla-
tion. This runs firmly against  egalitarian universalism which advocates 
universal human rights and equality before the law; the central tenet 
of the  UDHR . Accordingly, it disallows privileges on the grounds of 
culture and religion – which is the essence of multiculturalism and 
multifaithism. 
 If the OIC managed to achieve the dilution of the  UDHR , this will 
inevitably give confidence to Muslim groups in Britain (and indeed in 
western countries generally) such as the Islamic Sharia Council and 
Muslim Action Forum to lobby with greater vigour. This will indubitably 
be a setback for the further integration of Muslims into mainstream 
society. 
 What this discussion points to is straightforward: the foundational 
principle of an integrated, cohesive society that is based on justice and 
egalitarianism must be the advocacy of universal rights (sometimes 
referred to as  one law for all ). This sends out a powerful signal that govern-
ments are sincere and determined in attempting to build society on the 
basis of common citizenship and social justice, thereby casting aside the 
emphasis on ‘difference’ that has had such a corrosive, divisive, effect. 
Indeed, we can make the case that integration and social cohesion are 
improved the more religion and religious identity are confined to the 
private sphere. From this secular republican perspective, based on egali-
tarian universalism, the social equality of religion or belief approach is 
necessarily sub-optimal in that it is likely to entrench religious identity 
and exemptions on grounds of religion, which we argue run counter to 
the overarching societal goal of a more cohesive society. There is also 
the question of democracy. The privileges afforded to religions appear 
to run against the wishes of the majority in Britain. A poll conducted in 
November 2014 for the  Huffington Post , for example, “reveals that just 
8% of Britons describe themselves as very religious, with more than 60% 
saying they were not religious at all; and of the ‘non-religious’ people 
polled, more than 60% said they thought religion caused more problems 
than it solved” (Elgot 2014). 
 Concluding remarks 
 The crux of the matter regarding Muslim identity is that Islam is a very 
demanding religion that encompasses every aspect of life, from birth 
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till death. Hence, there is no separation between the public and private 
spheres or between religious and secular domains. To fully comply with 
Islamic  sharia law necessarily conflicts with the notion of universal rights 
and secular values; this is precisely the stance of OIC countries. In 2008, 
this was also recognised by Britain’s highest court concerning a case 
in which the government attempted to remove a woman and child to 
Lebanon. In a 5–0 ruling the Law Lords argued “that there was no place 
in  sharia for the equal treatment of the sexes. It would be a ‘flagrant 
breach’ of the  European Convention on Human Rights for the Government 
to remove a woman to Lebanon, where she would lose custody of her 
son because of  sharia -inspired family law” (Verkaik 2008). 
 From this perspective, the social equality of religion or belief is prob-
lematic as some religions, notably Islam, demand more than equality 
before the law, that is to say, not just protection under the law but legal 
privileges. In the Introduction (22–3 ), attention is drawn to the exemp-
tions on religious grounds to the extent that these “carve out an area in 
which normal equalities laws do not apply ... [and which] are extraordi-
nary provisions to find in the law of any country”. This is the inevitable 
outcome of a country deemed to be ‘multifaith’. To comply with just the 
civil laws under Islam (demands for  sharia -compliant criminal laws are 
rarely called for by mainstream Muslim organisations in the West) does 
indeed require myriad ‘extraordinary provisions’. 
 In the interests of social cohesion and better integration of Muslims in 
mainstream western societies, both the Government and wider society 
must resist demands for such privileges, not least because they are alien-
ating to the largely irreligious and secular majority society. That said, we 
can surmise that most mainstream Muslims in Europe are content not 
to fulfil all of Islam’s burdensome obligations and so will refrain from 
making inordinate demands for exemptions. In time, one hopes for the 
prospect of their acceding to the principle of equality before the law 
and – even in a self-styled multifaith society – acceptance of its secular 
nature. 
 The task for policy makers in Britain and other European countries, 
which is now of considerable urgency and importance, is how to reverse 
the processes of separatism identified above. These have reached worri-
some proportions, to the point of outright rejection of European society, 
with correspondingly high levels of psychic detachment, and generated 
considerable unease in all EU countries with significant Muslim popula-
tions. The overall objective, from this perspective, is to reduce psychic 
detachment so that universal rights, laws and values are internalised 
and trump the narrow Muslim identity that has become so prevalent. 
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The benefits of this are self-evident and significant, especially for 
future generations. It is not apparent that the social equality of religion 
approach can meet this formidable challenge. 
 Notes 
 1 .  Some of the reasons for this irreconcilability include “nine out of every ten 
agree that Muslim men in the Netherlands dominate their women ... Three out 
of every four Dutch agree that Muslims in the Netherlands raise their children 
in an authoritarian way” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 23). 
 2 .  This argument was first developed in Hasan (2010, Ch. 3). 
 3 .  Note that psychic detachment is rather distinct from that of the well-re-
searched phenomenon of ‘social exclusion’, which arises in the absence of 
integration in the labour market (see, for example, Levitas 1996; Blanc 1998). 
 4 .  The OIC was formed by Saudi Arabia in 1969, and is funded by it. It is now 
known as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. 
